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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, there has been heated debate over the extent to which
global convergence in corporate governance is attainable and desirable. One
thing is clear, however; international convergence in corporate governance
law has not been achieved.1 Many would ascribe that fact, among other
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
Copyright 2001. My thanks to Tom Baker, Phillip Blumberg, John Day, Mark Janis, Tom
Morawetz, Kurt Strasser, Peter Winship and Stephen Utz for their comments.
I. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, THE VERY UNCERTAIN PROSPECT OF 'GLOBAL'
CONVERGENCE IN- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (Working Paper 2000), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?.. .992&cftoken=52818259&abstractid=244742;
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
213 (1999); John C. Coffee Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
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things, to incompatible differences between market systems of corporate
governance, which have widely dispersed stock ownership and deep, liquid
stock markets, and block-holding systems, in which stocks are thinly traded
and control is held by insiders or banks. Market systems of corporate
governance typify the United States and Britain, while block-holding systems
are found in continental Europe, East Asia and most other capitalist
economies. 2
The nature of a system often shapes the legal relationships between
corporations and banks as financiers. Thus, in the United States, the most
prominent market system, banks are generally prohibited from owning equity
stakes in the corporations to which they lend, partly to avoid connected
lending to corporate affiliates of banks and partly to avoid aggregation of
financial power. 3 In contrast, in Germany and Japan (both of which are
block-holding systems), connected lending and equity ownership by banks are
mainstays of corporate finance. In both of those countries, banks traditionally
have been the largest equity-holders in major corporate borrowers and have
used their equity stakes to monitor loans. The same pattern exists in many
transition economies, albeit often without the safeguards that exist in
Germany.
Other important implications flow from differences in the relative
importance of capital markets and bank finance in market and block-holding
systems. Market systems put a premium on transparency and disclosure
because shareholders are typically dispersed and cannot monitor their
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 641-47 (1999); Mark
J. Roe, A Political Theor, of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
In referring to "corporate governance law," I consciously exclude national schemes of
securities regulation, which have undergone greater movement toward international
convergence due to systemic risk concerns that are comparable to similar concerns in the
banking industry. E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International
Monei': Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997); Coffee,
supra, at 650-53. Quite recently, with the growing fungibility of commercial banking and
securities, securities regulators and banking regulators have cooperated, through the Basel
Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), in
developing joint global standards. Joseph J. Norton, "International Financial Law, " An
IncreasingIl, Important Component of "hIternational Economic Law ": A Tribute to Professor
John H. Jackson, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 133, 139-41 (1999).
2. E.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note I, at 218; Coffee, supra note I, at 641-42, 647-
48.
3. PATRICIA A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS ANDTHRIFTS § 7.03[I][b] (2d ed. 2000 & 2001 Supp.).
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investments through day-to-day involvement. In contrast, block-holding
systems normally favor opacity over disclosure. In part, that is because
dispersed ownership is uncommon; in part, it is because lack of transparency
deters other competitors from doing business with corporate borrowers,
thereby enabling the banks that lend to them to obtain captive returns on their
investments. As a result, finance in block-holding systems tends to rely on
relationships of trust more than on impersonal markets and judicially
enforceable contracts. 4
Market and block-holding systems also differ in the level of protections
that are accorded to minority shareholders. In block-holding systems,
protections for minority investors are generally weaker than in market
systems. As a result, shareholders demand control stakes in block-holding
systems in order to protect their investments.
Given these differences between market systems and block-holding
systems, one might surmise that the same structural impediments to
international convergence in the corporate governance area would crop up in
cross-border banking regulation. In fact, however, convergence has made
greater headway in banking law than in corporate governance law.
Furthermore, the trend toward global convergence in banking cuts across
market and block-holding systems alike.
Given the close relationship between banks and corporate governance,
why has global convergence in banking made greater strides than in corporate
governance law? At first blush, one might suppose that the movement toward
international convergence in banking is propelled by Darwinian notions of
efficiency, i.e., the idea that one set of regulatory principles will result in
optimal banking operations around the world and that systems that fail to
evolve toward those principles are doomed to failure. If that were the case,
however, why would banking regulation be any more conducive to uniform
oversight based on efficiency notions than corporate governance?
This article sets out to examine these questions. I begin by describing the
forces behind global convergence in banking regulation and how those forces
differ from the constellation of forces affecting convergence in corporate
governance. In that regard, I suggest that global convergence in banking has
been reactive in nature and has responded more to perceived threats than to
idealized notions of efficiency. Nevertheless, the outcome of that
4. See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the
East Asian Crisis, II J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40, 41 (1999).
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international project has been to produce unitary standards that emulate
specific efficiency paradigms.
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether those efficiency notions
represent an inevitable development or whether global convergence in
banking is a transient phenomenon that contains the seeds of instability. I
conclude that the efficiency paradigm that is implicit in the Basel
Committee's pronouncements is an impoverished model that fails to account
for broader systemic tradeoffs and varying stages of economic development.
I. GLOBAL CONVERGENCE IN BANKING REGULATION AND ITS
UNDERLYING FORCES
Why has global convergence in banking advanced farther than in
corporate governance? After all, the efficiency norms that are imbedded in
international banking standards arguably apply to corporations of all types.
As I will explain, however, the greater speed with which international
standards emerged in banking was a function of concerns that are unique to
the financial services industry and that are otherwise absent in corporate
governance, i.e., worldwide financial contagion and fears about ensuing
political unrest. Due to the often-urgent nature of those concerns, the Basel
Committee has been able to achieve at least surface agreement on
international banking standards, despite major differences between market
and block-holding systems.
A. The MOVEMENT TOWARD GLOBAL STANDARDS IN BANKING
The movement toward uniform global banking standards5 began in the
mid-1970s, triggered by the failure of the Bankhaus Herstatt in West
5. Global convergence can come in a variety of forms, including binding treaties,
voluntary compliance with multilateral standards, standardization of industry practices or
conscious parallelism in the enactment of national laws. In banking regulation, the movement
toward uniform standards has been accomplished, not through treaties, but through "soft law"
in the form of model principles and guidelines, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, for adoption on a voluntary basis by signatory countries. E.g., Lawrence L.C.
Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA.
J. INT'L L. I, 3-6 (1998). Consequently, I will use "convergence" as it applies to banking
regulation to denote non-binding multilateral standards that individual sovereign nations adopt
as law.
The Basel Committee's accomplishments are not the only evidence of convergence.
Further movement in that direction can be seen in the General Agreement on Trade in Services
and the European Union's Second Banking Directive. See. e.g., Mary E. Footer, GATT and
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Germany in 1974.6 Under the auspices of the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, the Group of 10 (the G- 10) linked
arms with Luxembourg and Switzerland to form what is known today as the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 7 The Basel Committee's stated
purpose is to encourage progress toward convergence in the banking
regulations of its members by promulgating model standards and serving as
an information exchange. While the Basel Committee's standards are non-
binding, they are endorsed by the governors of the G- 10 central banks and are
formulated with the expectation of adoption by G- 10 members. 8
The earliest pronouncements of the Basel Committee addressed the
anomaly that banks were increasingly multinational, but regulation was
national in scope. Growth in international trade had spurred growth in
international banking. Advances in computerization and the management of
risk through derivatives had also fueled growth. The progressive dismantling
of restrictions on capital movements in many countries caused foreign
currency trading to surge, especially on the financial derivatives markets. 9
Indeed, ultimately in recognition of that growth, the Uruguay Round's
General Agreement on Trade in Services (G.A.T.S.)10 was hammered out to
liberalize cross-border trade in financial services.
The cross-border expansion of banking in the past thirty years, however,
came at the expense of worldwide financial contagion. Repeatedly, banking
regulators have been saddled with crises after foreign activities by local banks
the Multilateral Regulation of Banking Services, 27 INT'L LAW. 343 (1993); Christos
Hadjiemmanuil, European Monetary Union, the European System of Central Banks, and
Banking Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of the Maastricht Treat,, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 105 (1997). With respect to prudential regulation of commercial banking practices,
however, the Basel Committee is the foremost purveyor of international standards.
Many, including sometimes the Basel Committee itself, use the alternative spelling
"Basle." For the sake of consistency, I will use the German spelling "Basel" except where
citations or quotations otherwise require.
6. See Joseph J. Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Committee on Bank Capital
Adequacy and the JuI' 1988 Report on "International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards, " 23 INT'L LAW. 245, 247-48 (1989).
7. Id. The G-10 consists of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id. at 248 n. 16.
8. Id. at 262.
9. E.g., Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network - What Role (IfAny)
for the IMF?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1957 (1994).
10. See Footer, supra note 5, at 345-51.
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evaded regulation and resulted in bank failures, inflicting losses at home.
Comparable harm occurred when poorly supervised foreign banks expanded
overseas and wreaked damage on their host countries. In response, the Basel
Committee's first major initiative, the Basel Concordat of 1975, formulated
guidelines for consolidated supervision by home countries and host countries
of the foreign activities of banks. I I Later sovereign debt crises prompted the
Basel Committee to revise the Concordat in 198312 and to supplement the
Revised Concordat in 1990.13 A year later, in 1991, the notorious failure of
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) sent shock-waves
around the world and caused the Basel Committee, in 1992, to issue new
minimum standards for the supervision of international banking groups. 14
As this chronology suggests, the Basel Committee's earliest concerns
were with cross-border supervision. Only later did the Basel Committee turn
to the substantive content of banking regulation. In 1988, the Basel
Committee issued the Basel Accord, which called for minimum capital
standards for commercial banks pegged at eight percent of risk-weighted
assets.15 Capital adequacy is a mainstay of banking regulation: it seeks to
ensure that banks have an adequate cushion against losses for the protection
of depositors. The Basel Committee's contribution was to require higher-risk
11. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, History oj'the Basle Committee and its
Membership, Compendium of documents produced by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (Feb. 2000).
12. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PrinCiples for the Supervision of Banks'
Foreign Establishments ('the Concordat'), Compendium of documents produced by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (May
1983).
13. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Information Flows Between Banking
Supervisory Authorities, (Supplement of the 'Concordat ,, Compendium of documents
produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (April 1990).
14. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Minimnm Standards for the Supervision
of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-border Establishments, Compendium of
documents produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (July 1992). See generally RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK
REGULATION AFTER BCCI (1994).
15. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, Publications, available at
http://www.bis.org/pubi/index.htm (July 1988).
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banks to maintain commensurately higher capital. 16 Since its appearance
twelve years ago, the Basel Accord has had astonishingly wide acceptance,
with adoption by approximately one hundred countries.1 7 If anything
epitomizes the movement toward global convergence in financial services
regulation, it is unquestionably the Basel Accord.
The Basel Committee's moorings in fixed notions of economic efficiency
are most evident from its substantive banking standards. The Basel Accord
proceeded on the premise that a single capital structure, based on a minimum
capital ratio of eight percent, was universally optimal for banks, both in terms
of return on equity and adequate protection for depositors or their insurers.
As such, it embraced a determinist notion of economic efficiency that
assumed, as Professor John Coffee has put it in a somewhat different context,
that "large-scale firms [would] adopt a common set of structural
characteristics" and would not subsequently depart from that predetermined
equilibrium.
The same lockstep notions of efficiency appeared in the Basel
Committee's more ambitious attempt a decade later to formulate a
comprehensive regime for the prudential regulation of commercial banks. In
1997, the Basel Committee issued the Core Principlesfor Effective Banking
Supervision, its most comprehensive set of banking standards to date. 19 In
a set of twenty-five core principles, the Basel Committee formulated
substantive standards on everything from the preconditions for effective
banking supervision and chartering standards to risk management,
examinations, disclosure and enforcement.
In considering the efficiency rationale behind those standards, it is worth
examining the example of Principle 10 of the Core Principles on "connected
lending." Principle 10 states:
In order to prevent abuses arising from connected lending,
banking supervisors must have in place requirements that
banks lend to related companies and individuals on an arm's-
16. PATRICIA JACKSON ET AL., Capital requirements and bank behaviour: the impact of the
Basle Accord I, in BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Working Papers No. 1,
available at http://www.bis.org/publ.htm (April 1999) [hereinafter BASEL ACCORD STUDY].
17. Id.
19. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Core PrinciplesJbr Effective Banking
Supervision, Compendium of documents produced by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter Core
Principles].
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length basis, that such extensions of credit are effectively
monitored, and that other appropriate steps are taken to
control or mitigate the risks. 20
Thus, the embedded notion is that efficiency is to be measured, in isolation,
by terms that would be extended to previously unfamiliar borrowers, without
regard for the feasibility of setting those terms or other social benefits that
might accrue from connected lending to related borrowers.
This formulation of efficiency is inextricably bound up with the Basel
Committee's moorings in the Western industrialized world and particularly
in market systems, primarily the United Kingdom and the United States. The
Basel Committee, as Stephen Zamora has described it, is "an exclusive club
representing the central banks of the most highly (Group of Ten)
industrialized countries" and consists of the major powers of Western Europe,
the United States and Japan. 2 1 Until recently, the Basel Committee
assiduously resisted expanding the Committee's membership to Third World
countries. 22 Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the 1988 Basel Accord
was the product of behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the two most important
market systems, the United Kingdom and the United States.23
20. Id. at 27.
21. Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network - What Role (IfAny') for the
IMF?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1970 (1994).
This is not to say that the G-10 regularly achieves full consensus. There are many topics
about which the bank supervisors of the different G- 10 nations have failed to agree. Examples
include the debate over activities restrictions and universal banking, the optimal degree of
concentration within the banking industry, state subsidies to local banks and bank secrecy.
E.g., Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case
of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595 (1999); German
Banks Under Fire, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 1999; Bank Rules in Disarray, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 27, 1999, at 75.
22. JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 229
(1995) [hereinafter STANDARDS].
23. The Basel Accord was hammered out in haste after the United States, the United
Kingdom and Japan proposed their own trilateral agreement on capital standards, the effect of
which would have been to raise the bar to entry by most of the world's other major banks. The
following protest by one observer captured that dynamic and the tension that ensued:
The two countries [the United States and the United Kingdom] -- the
homes of the two largest financial centres in the world -- have agreed to a
joint approach in defining the capital of banks, laying down a system for
valuing banks' assets including off-balance-sheet operations and allocating
them to specific categories or risk. As a next step, they are trying to reach
agreement with Japan. This would cover the three most important
(Vol. 7:2
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In more recent years, stung by allegations of hegemony on the part of
Western capital-exporting powers, the Basel Committee decided to include
banking supervisors from offshore countries and emerging economies in its
deliberations in order to enlist their enforcement on a voluntary basis and
confer greater legitimacy on the Committee's efforts. 24  The Basel
Committee's standards have also been enforced in emerging economies
through considerably more coercive means. The most potent means of such
enforcement in recent years has been International Monetary Fund (IMF)
conditionality, whereby the IMF has insisted on compliance with the Basel
Accord and the Core Principles as a condition of aid.25
B. THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BANK
REGULATORY STANDARDS
In corporate governance, as opposed to banking, there is no pretense of
a consensus among the G-10 nations on an optimal set of standards.
Commentators have advanced a number of explanations for this state of
affairs, including political rent seeking and path dependency, the role of legal
financial centres in the world. Countries not prepared to join an agreement'
among this group of three countries could easily be put under pressure. It
would be sufficient to bar their banks from using the three financial centres
or to subject them to special treatment. If they wish to remain competitive
internationally, the large banks that operate worldwide can no longer be
absent from these centres today. They would quickly try to encourage
their governments to co-operate internationally....
However, should the example set a precedent and the strategy of the
two powers be extended to other fields of harmonising banking
supervision -- as a substitute, so to speak, for internationally negotiated
compromises -- then the willingness to co-operate internationally could
suffer damage in the long run. In view of the problems that need to be
solved, this would be a harmful development.
Dr. Lusser assesses various aspects of international co-operation in the field of monetary
policy, 64 BIS REV., Apr. 1, 1987, at 6. Cf BASLE ACCORD STUDY, supta note 16, at 38
(discussing joint statement of January 8, 1987 by the Federal Reserve Board and the Bank of
England announcing their intent to establish bilateral minimum risk-based capital
requirements).
24. Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New hiternational
Initiatives for the New World of Volatile Capital Flows To and From Emerging Markets, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 807, 819 (1998); Lee, supra note 5. at 6 n.20; Norton, supra note 6, at 251 -
52.
25. Lee, supra note 5, at 38-39.
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institutions in shaping the preconditions for efficiency, and varying liquidity
preferences. 2 6
So why has consensus in the banking area been easier to achieve? After
all, the banking regimes in the G-10 countries grow out of the same political
milieus as corporate governance regimes. Furthermore, one could argue that
the determinist notions of economic efficiency that undergird the Basel
Committee's substantive pronouncements apply equally to corporate
governance.
Nonetheless, global convergence has made greater headway in banking
than in corporate governance. That can be explained, in large part, by many
of the same reasons that cause governments to regulate banks in the first
place. The preeminent reason, systemic risk, is reactive in nature and flows
from common concerns by national bank supervisors about the domestic
repercussions of cross-border banking crises that they cannot individually
control. As in corporate governance, it has not been enough to subscribe to
the view that international corporations are evolving toward a common ideal
of efficiency. Rather, in banking, the main impetus towards harmonization
consisted of international banking crises of catastrophic proportions that
could not be quelled without international cooperation.
The roots of systemic risk lie in the capital structure and mutual
interdependence of banks.2 7 Banks obtain the bulk of their funds from debt
in the form of demand deposits, rather than from shareholders' equity.
Because banks borrow short and lend long, they suffer from a fundamental
mismatch in the maturities of their assets (which are usually illiquid) and their
liabilities (which are liquid). When depositors demand more funds than the
bank has on hand, the result can be a devastating bank run.
Ordinarily, under the law of fractional reserves, banks can estimate how
much money to have on hand each day to satisfy depositors, needs. If rumors
or reports of bank distress circulate, however, causing depositors to fear an
imminent bank run, that fear can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Absent
a lender of last resort, a bank that experiences a run will not be able to pay off
its depositors because it will not be able to liquidate its assets immediately at
full value. Depositors unlucky enough to stand at the back of the line will
lose their money and the bank will close its doors.
26. E.g., Coffee, supra note I, at 642-48.
27. For fuller discussion of these dynamics, e.g., MCCOY, supra note 3, at I-I through I-
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As this suggests, solicitude for depositors is part of the motivation behind
government regulation of banks, both out of concern for political instability
and to encourage households to channel their savings into the economy.
Thus, a fundamental purpose of banking regulation is to solve the information
asymmetry that exists between banks and their depositors by interposing the
government as a monitor. Monitoring by demand depositors is normally not
cost-effective due to depositors' lack of information about their banks and the
small size of their deposits. Even if monitoring were possible, depositors
usually find it more cost-effective to exercise their rights of immediate exit
through withdrawal than to engage in continuous monitoring.
Depositors are not the only subject of concern for government regulators.
Governments also monitor banks out of concern for systemic risk. Banks are
inextricably linked to one another through the payments system, as well as
through an intricate web of inter-bank lending and derivatives swaps. As a
result of those linkages, if a major bank fails and defaults on its obligations,
other banks may fail, causing a ripple effect throughout the banking system.
Insofar as banks are levers of monetary policy, the ensuing bank panic can
have profound negative macroeconomic consequences, including contraction
of the money supply and a resulting economic downturn. As such, systemic
risk constitutes a negative externality of banks, because failed banks and their
shareholders do not have to pay for systemic harms they inflict on other banks
and other economies. As the largest banks grow larger, moreover, the danger
of contagion grows. While the likelihood of contagion is subject to debate,
governments are loath to risk it because the consequences can be
devastating. 28
In the global context, contagion is of even greater concern, not only
because of the vast size and scope of international banking operations, but
because jurisdictional boundaries hamper the ability of bank regulators, both
de jure and de facto, to supervise banking operations abroad. Losses from
speculative overseas banking activities can easily spread to a bank's home
country, inflicting losses which regulators are helpless to prevent.
28. E.g., RANDALL S. KROSZNER, BANK REGULATION: WILL REGULATORS CATCH UP WITH
THE MARKET? 9-12 (Cato Inst. Briefing Paper No. 45, 1999), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-045es.html; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank
Failtres, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1157
(1988); David G. Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
477, 524-26 (1996).
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For these reasons, systemic risk has been the most powerful driving force
behind the Basel Committee's pronouncements. As the Basel Committee
noted with respect to the Basel Accord, the Committee "believed that the
[capital adequacy] framework would help to strengthen the soundness and
stability of the international banking system by encouraging international
banking organizations to boost their capital positions."29 Indeed, the bulk of
the Basel Committee's initiatives have been undertaken in response to global
banking crises. Whenever major international banking scandals have roiled
the financial world in recent years -- witness Franklin National Bank,
Bankhaus Herstatt, Banco Ambrosiano in Italy, Continental Illinois, BCCI
and Baring Bank -- the Basel Committee has regularly responded with a
regulatory pronouncement. 30 The thrust of those pronouncements has been
to assure uniformly high prudential safeguards throughout major banking
markets and cross-border enforcement. The collapse of the Thai bhat in 1997
and the Russian ruble in 1998, with their worldwide repercussions,
underscored the frailties of interdependent markets and the need for global
coordination and oversight. 3 1
In contrast, outside of the financial services industry, contagion almost
never is a concern in corporate governance. The reason why is that other
types of corporations do not have to resort to the highly unstable device of
demand deposits in order to finance their operations. Established
corporations get outside financing through equity and through loans; other
corporations that lack access to outside financing achieve growth through
retained earnings. While the assets of most corporations are illiquid, so are
their liabilities, which normally cannot be withdrawn immediately upon
demand. 32 Consequently, in industrial corporations, rapid contagion is not
a concern as it is in banking. To be sure, one corporation's death may lead to
the eventual failure of other corporations that are its suppliers, but the illiquid
nature of their liabilities means that failure will be slow rather than
precipitous, allowing time for countermeasures and intervention. Thus,
discussions of corporate governance are almost never animated by concerns
over the larger macroeconomic consequences of corporate failures.
29. BASEL ACCORD STUDY, sutpra note 16, at 1.
30. E.g., Norton, supra note 6, at 245-46.
31. See generally Lichtenstein, supra note 24, at 807.
32. Notes that are subject to call upon default are an exception.
[Vol. 7:2
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Similarly, systemic risk is closely related to the other motivating factors
behind the Basel Committee's standards, i.e., competitive parity and market
entry. In major Western countries, governments reserve discretion to deny
entry to the banking industry through charter denials. While entry controls
in banking have obvious anti-competitive implications, normally they are
justified as necessary to ensuring the solvency of banks. Concerns about lax
oversight are often stronger for overseas banks than for their domestic
counterparts, which is one reason why entry controls are often imposed on
foreign banks. Given those supervisory concerns, uniform regulatory
standards can help open markets by providing host countries with some
assurance that the identical regulatory standards are being enforced in the
home country of a foreign competitor. Similarly, for foreign banks that have
already achieved market entry abroad, "a standard approach applied to
internationally active banks in different countries" helps reduce competitive
inequalities. 33
Obviously, in corporate governance generally, market entry is of concern
as well. In trade for goods as opposed to financial services, however, usually
the concern is with market entry in a narrower sense. Corporations that are
in the business of selling goods almost never are subject to barriers against
entering foreign markets due to reservations by the host country about their
form of corporate governance. In other words, in manufacturing, whatever
market barriers exist operate against the entry of particular goods rather than
against particular companies or particular forms of corporate governance. In
contrast, in the area of bank regulation, market controls are elevated to the
level of outright prohibitions againstfirms, based at least in part on solvency
concerns. Thus, the stakes associated with market entry in banking are usually
considerably higher than for firns that are not financial services providers.
Lastly, it is necessary to observe that international convergence in
banking, in contrast with corporate governance, has occurred in less visible
fora where change may be easier to accomplish. In civil law jurisdictions and
increasingly in common law jurisdictions, corporate governance law is
formulated by the legislature, often in the harsh glare of publicity. In
contrast, the bulk of international banking standards are initiated by the Basel
Committee, which attempts whenever possible to operate informally and
behind closed doors. 34 Once a particular set of principles has been
33. BASEL ACCORD STUDY, Supra note 16, at 1.
34. Norton, supra note 6, at 249.
2001]
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
formulated and endorsed by the G- 10, adoption of those principles may be
accomplished by executive decree or agency order in many countries, without
the need for statutory enactment. The obscure nature of capital adequacy
rules and other forms of banking regulation aid the Basel Committee's
attempts to preserve a low profile. As a result, political impediments to
convergence in banking regulation, at least initially, may be lower than in
corporate governance. At the same time, the behind-the-scenes nature of that
process raises very real questions of political legitimacy.
To summarize, concerns about systemic risk, market entry and
competitive parity coalesced in global harmonization in banking to a degree
not yet seen in corporate governance law. Despite that rather remarkable
accomplishment, the Basel Accord, in implementation, has developed fissures
that cannot be ignored.
II. CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN GLOBAL CONVERGENCE
I have argued that the result of the Basel Committee's initiatives has been
to promote a uniform conception of economic efficiency.35 Nevertheless, it
would be a grave mistake, based on a single snapshot, to conclude that
convergence toward a unitary norm of economic efficiency is inevitable. It
is a common failing to treat harmonization as a unidirectional movement,
rather than as a series of reactions and counter-reactions that may trigger
movements toward and away from shifting equilibria. Accordingly, it is
important to ask whether the Basel Committee and its member states are
35. As recent moves toward deregulation in the United States have shown, efficiency
norms do not necessarily result in stricter regulation. Regulators face a mixed array of
considerations and pressures when attempting to formulate optimal levels of regulation.
Nevertheless, among the major capital-exporting countries, fears about systemic risk from
international contagion have been sufficiently insistent that the Basel Committee's products
have generally resulted in stricter standards to date.
Due to the newness of the Core Principles, most of the available data bears on the Basel
Accord's effect on capital adequacy levels. The Basel Committee recently concluded "that at
least initially, the introduction of formal minimum capital requirements across the G-I 0 appears
to have induced relatively weakly capitalized institutions to maintain higher capital ratios."
BASEL ACCORD STUDY, supra note 16, at 2. Moreover, "those countries which were close to,
or below, the Basle minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8% in 1988 evidenced a much higher
overall increase than those which had historically high capital ratios." Id. at 6-15. In the study,
the Basel Committee was unable to conclude definitively, however, that the Basel capital
adequacy ratios were responsible for the increase, as opposed to increased bank supervision or
market discipline. Id. at 15.
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subject to pressures that could cause banks or member states to depart from
the Committee's supposedly efficient norms.
The seemingly rosy progress of the Basel Committee to date might
suggest that centrifugal forces are not at work. In the short run, the
confluence of forces has favored stricter uniform standards. Regulators are
not the sole impetus for uniformity in banking, moreover; the impetus also
comes from major international banks. Uniformity helps international banks
by leveling the playing field so that regulated banks in one country do not
suffer a cost disadvantage vis-A-vis their peers abroad due to stiffer regulatory
requirements at home. Precisely for that reason, competitive equality was one
of the stated rationales for the 1988 Basel capital adequacy accord.36
In the international arena, the strongest large banks have furthermore
favored stricter uniform standards in order to hurt weaker competitors. If
uniform standards are set sufficiently high, weaker banks will not be able to
meet them and will either be acquired by stronger banks or close their doors.
The Basel Accord, which raised minimum capital levels above the then-
prevailing average in the United States, is just one example. In the United
States, numerous weakened banks were acquired in mergers after the United
States adopted risk-based capital standards under the 1988 Basel Accord.37
Similarly, higher uniform standards can eliminate potential future
competition by setting a higher (and sometimes insuperable) bar to new
entrants to the industry. This phenomenon has been the source of endless
controversy in emerging economies, where fledgling domestic banks
complain that major Western international banks have exerted pressure for
adherence to global prudential standards in order to corner the market for
banking services. 38
Other private benefits inure to major international banks from uniform
regulation. From the standpoint of cost savings and efficiency, international
banks would prefer to operate on a consolidated basis, with one set of capital
rules, accounting standards, internal controls, regulatory reports and books.39
36. E.g., Zamora, supra note 2 1, at 1958.
37. See generally John P. O'Keefe, Banking Industry Consolidation: Financial Attributes
of Merging Banks, 9 FDIC BANKING REv. (1996), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/1996fall/merger.html.
38. E.g., Roman Ternill, The Promises and Perils of Globalization: The Asian Financial
Crisis, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 280 (1999).
39. Michael E. Patterson, Convergence of Global Financial Services, 21 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 377, 381-82 (1997).
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Since a single international regulatory system is nowhere close to a reality,
international banks must settle for a second-best solution, in the form of
substantial uniformity across the various national banking regulation regimes.
Thus, a subsidiary goal of cross-border uniformity is a lower cost structure
and greater economies of scope and scale for international banks.
Notwithstanding the competitive motives of large international banks,
emerging economies may have reasons of their own to sign on to the Basel
Committee standards. Domestic banks in emerging economies that want to
attract major Western firms as clients and establish correspondent
relationships find it easier to establish customer trust by observing the Basel
Committee standards. Foreign investors are unwilling to use local banks for
their banking and payments needs unless the safety of their deposits can be
assured.40 Absent a credible system of deposit insurance guarantees,
compliance with rigorous international standards sends a signal that a bank
can be trusted with one's deposits. As banks in emerging economies mature,
moreover, and extend their own operations abroad, they will need to comply
with Basel Committee standards in order to gain entry to the major Western
banking centers. Finally, in times of domestic monetary crisis, compliance
with the Basel Committee's standards is a standard condition of IMF aid.
Nevertheless, the championing of a single, lockstep model of economic
efficiency will inevitably be followed by antithesis in the form of economic
and political destabilization. One source of instability inheres in the law of
cartels. Another source of instability grows out of the fact that market
systems and block-holding systems have deep-seated differences in their
constructs of economic efficiency. These latter differences are especially
apparent in norms concerning connected lending.
A. Cartel Dynamics
First, with respect to the law of cartels: one way to view the Basel
Committee's actions is as the actions of a cartel (one that is governmentally
sanctioned). Under the auspices of that cartel, the members of the G- 10,
through the Basel Committee, have agreed on a pricing structure for a
regulatory tax on the business of banking. In keeping with the Basel
Committee's pronouncements, that regulatory tax is supposed to be uniform
throughout signatory countries through adherence to common standards. The
40. Susan M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, International Banking Activities: The
Role of the Federal Reserve Bank in Domestic Capital Markets, 21 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1754,
1757 (1998).
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signatory countries include most, if not all, of the major financial centers of
the world and control the majority of bank financing worldwide. Thus, by
imposing higher standards, the Basel Committee can control the supply of
financial services to a significant extent and maintain prices.
The devil, however, lies in enforcement. As with any cartel, the Basel
Committee is susceptible to cheating by individual banks and member
states.4 1 Member states have an incentive to relax their enforcement of the
Core Principles and the Basel Accord whenever they can derive net benefits
without getting caught.
In many cases, it is relatively easy for a country to cheat on the Core
Principles and the Basel Accord and evade detection, at least in the short to
medium term. Banking regulation is notoriously opaque around the world,
with respect to disclosures by regulators and by banks themselves. Unlike
securities regulation, which is premised on transparency and disclosure,
banking regulation regimes around the world are highly secretive, even in
societies that are otherwise open, in part due to fears about bank runs.
Compounding this problem, because the Basel Committee operates through
consensual standards, it lacks formal enforcement mechanisms. 42 Unlike the
regulatory system of a single sovereign nation, there is no international super-
regulator with binding authority to keep national regulators in line.
Accordingly, whether a country's banking regulators enforce the Basel
Committee's principles once those principles become law may be difficult to
ascertain, except from anecdotal evidence.
Another inducement to cheating consists of the fact that accounting
treatments can give a false appearance of compliance. 43  Although
international accounting systems have moved towards common norms,
significant national differences in accounting treatments remain. The
effectiveness of risk-weighted capital, for instance, has a lot to do with
whether assets are represented at cost (in which case the sting may be less
41. While this point has been briefly mentioned in passing, it has not been developed in
the literature. E.g., Eric J. Gouvin, Banking in North America: The Triumph of Public Choice
over Public Policy, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I, 26 (1998).
42. E.g., Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Bank for International Settlements: Committee on
Banking Regulations and Supervisoly Practices: Consultative Paper on International
Convergence of Capital Measures and Capital Standards, 30 I.L.M. 967 (1991).
43. E.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A New Capital Adequacy
Framework 10-1I1, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12,
2001).
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harsh) or fair market value. These differences make it harder to detect the
extent of any cheating.
Other cheating is easier to detect, but difficult to counteract absent an
overarching regulator. Thus, in recent years, German regulators have been
accused of manipulating the risk-weight categories in two respects. They
have given unduly low weights to bonds issued by German mortgage banks.
In addition, they have permitted German banks to meet core capital
requirements through a form of subordinated debt that other G- 10 regulators
had agreed to prohibit. 44
Finally, banks and nations can evade higher standards through regulatory
arbitrage, which is not strictly cheating but lawful exploitation of intentional
or unintentional regulatory loopholes in a manner that violates the spirit of the
standards. Under the 1988 Basel capital adequacy accord (the substantive
Basel pronouncement with the longest track record), four prominent examples
of regulatory arbitrage can be discerned.
1. Securitization
The most important example of regulatory arbitrage under the Basel
Accord has been the use of securitization by United States and European
banks to sell off loans to avoid higher capital requirements that otherwise
would apply if those loans remained on the books. In securitizations, banks
bundle their loans or other assets and sell interests in those bundles to the
public in the form of securities that are backed by the assets. A window for
regulatory arbitrage occurs because banks sign recourse clauses in which they
44. German Banks Under Fire, supra note 21, at 20; German,'s Protective Wings, THE
ECONOMIST, May 22, 1999, at 83; Bank Ru/es in Disarray, supra note 2 1, at 75-76.
In the negotiations leading up to the 1999 proposed revisions to the Basel Accord,
Germany continued to press for special treatment. The negotiations over the revisions became
deadlocked when Germany insisted on a special German exception to the one hundred percent
weight for commercial-property lending, on grounds that such lending has been low-risk
historically in Germany when compared with other countries. Germanyv's Protective Wings,
supra note 2 1, at 82-83; see also Bank Rules in Disarray, supra note 21, at 76. In the proposal,
the Committee broke the logjam by stating that "mortgages on commercial real estate do not,
in principle, justify other than a 100% weighting for loans secured." BASEt. COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, A New Capital Adequacyv Framework 31 (June 1999), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (emphasis added). The Economist laterjibed that the "two
weasel words . . . 'in principle' were designed to "allow Germans (but, with luck, nobody
else) to give their mortgage banks generous treatment." Growing Basle, THE ECONOMIST, June
5, 1999, at 70. See also Daniel Pruzin, Capital Requirements: Basle Commnittee"s Capital
Proposals Ain to Measure True Risks of Banks' Assest, BNA BANKING DAILY, June 4, 1999.
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agree to indemnify the buyers of the securities if any of the underlying loans
go into default. Such clauses, otherwise known as "credit enhancements,"
make it easier to market securitizations to the investing public.
The problem with recourse clauses is that current regulations do not
necessarily require banks to maintain capital that is commensurate to the risks
retained. Under U.S. banking regulations, banks must reserve eight cents on
the dollar in capital for any commercial loans on their books. If a bank
instead takes those loans off its books by securitizing the loans with recourse,
it currently must reserve the lesser of eight cents on the dollar or the amount
of the bank's maximum contractual exposure under the recourse clause. That
is true even if the residual interest that the bank retains under the recourse
clause exceeds eight cents on the dollar. If the securitized loans are highly
risky (a recent hallmark of bank securitizations of subprime loans in the
United States), or if the bank has forfeited servicing rights that would
otherwise enable the bank to monitor the loans closely to facilitate prompt
repayment, the bank may eventually sustain losses that exceed the capital
reserved.45 Thus, U.S. banks have incentives to engage in securitization with
risky recourse provisions because they could boost their capital ratios under
federal banking regulations as long as two conditions are met: (1) the banks
retain the risk of default through recourse clauses; and (2) the recourse
interests exceed eight percent of the value of the securitized pool. 46 The same
phenomenon has occurred in Western Europe.
45. An example from regulations proposed by federal banking regulators in the fall of 2000
illustrates the point. Assume that a bank securitizes subprime credit card loans valued at $100
million. In order to market the securities, the bank agrees to accept recourse for up to $15
million of the loans (fifteen percent) in the case any of the loans go into default. Under current
federal regulations, the bank only needs to reserve capital against the recourse interest of eight
percent, instead of fifteen percent. Capital: Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines;
Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance; Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations
of Other Transfers of Financial Assets, 65 Fed. Reg. 57993, 57996 (Sept. 27, 2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3,208, 225,325, 567).
46. E.g., Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy
Guidelines; Capital Maintenance; Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations of Other Transfers
of Financial Assets, 65 Fed. Reg. at 57995-97; BASEL ACCORD STUDY, supra note 16, at 21-26,
45-52; Susan M. Phillips, Syinposium: Derivatives & Risk Management: Kenote Address, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 767, 774 (1997); Daniel Pruzin, Basle Committee Details Proposal to Use
Market Discipline with Bank Capital Rules, BNA BANKING DAILY, Jan. 19, 2000.
In September 2000, federal banking regulators proposed amendments to U.S. capital
standards to require insured depository institutions to hold dollar-for-dollar capital for retained
recourse interests, even if that capital exceeds the capital an institution otherwise would have
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This technique grew so quickly in the United States and Western Europe
that "[f]or certain banks," the Basel Committee concluded that securitization
was "undoubtedly starting to undermine the comparability and even the
meaningfulness of the capital ratios maintained."4 7 Because of disparities in
the growth of securitization internationally, banks in the United States and
Western Europe have been able to avoid maintaining capital commensurate
with their risks while gaining an unfair advantage in the application of the
Basel capital adequacy standards. 48
2. Manipulation Of The Risk Weight Categories
The second example of regulatory arbitrage consists of exploitation by
banks of the Basel Accord's relatively crude system of weighting risk.49
Under the 1988 risk-weighted capital system, assets are divided into four
broad categories, referred to as "buckets." Each bucket has a different weight,
according to its supposed level of risk. The bucket that is deemed the highest
risk (consisting of unsecured loans, commercial loans, real estate owned, and
loans to non-OECD foreign borrowers and governments) is weighted one
hundred percent, while the bucket deemed free of credit risk (consisting of
cash, U.S. government obligations, Federal Reserve Bank stock and
obligations, and gold bullion) is weighted zero. In between falls the bucket
for low-risk assets (such as loans backed by cash deposits, certain government
guarantees and government securities), which is weighted twenty percent,
joined by the bucket for medium-risk -assets (such as loans secured by
residential real estate and certain revenue bonds), which is weighted fifty
to reserve to retain the entire asset on its books. In addition, the regulators proposed capping
residual interests at twenty-five percent of Tier I capital in order to prevent over-concentration
in the holdings of recourse interests. Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines;
Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance; Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations
of Other Transfers of Financial Assets, 65 Fed. Reg at 57995-97; see also Risk-Based Capital
Standards; Recourse and Direct Credit Substitutes, 65 Fed. Reg. 12320 (Mar. 8, 2000) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567).
47. BASEL ACCORD STUDY, supra note 16, at 4; see also id. at 3-4, 21-27, 45-52; German
Banks Under Fire, supra note 2 1, at 19-20.
48. E.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A New Capital Adequacy
Framework 9, 36 (June 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm; Capital;
Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines, Capital
Maintenance; Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations of Other Transfers of Financial Assets,
65 Fed. Reg. at 57994-96.
49. See generally Heath Price Tarbert, Are hiernational Capital Adequaci Rules
Adequate? The Basle Accord and Beyond, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1771, 1800-01 (2000).
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percent. 50 To determine how much capital must be held against a particular
asset, regulators multiply the weight of the applicable bucket by eight percent.
Thus, a loan weighted twenty percent requires the bank to hold capital in the
amount of 20 percent times 8 percent, or 1.6 percent of the value of the asset.
The four-bucket system assumes, however, that assets within each bucket
have equal risk, when often that is not the case. Commercial loans, for
example, are lumped into a single bucket, whether a corporate borrower has
a sterling AAA credit rating or is in danger of default. Thus, the system gives
banks incentives to shed lower-risk assets for higher-risk assets within each
bucket. It is relatively easy to engage in those tactics, moreover, without
detection. Due to methodological difficulties, studies attempting to detect
that activity have been inconclusive. Nevertheless, there is widespread
agreement that the problem exists. 51
Similarly, the four-bucket system assumes that assets with higher weights
have higher risks than lower-weighted assets. That is not always the case.
Relatively risky loans to South Korean banks, for instance, require four-fifths
less capital than loans to United States companies with AAA credit, simply
because South Korea is a member of the OECD.52 Under the circumstances,
the rational choice would be to lend to South Korean banks.
3. Off-balance-sheet Items
The Basel Accord's treatment of off-balance-sheet items provides a third
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Under the current Accord, off-balance-
sheet items in the form of commitments with an original maturity of one year
or less do not require capital, while commitments with a longer maturity are
50. McCoY, supra note 3, § 6.03.
51. E.g., VIRAL V. ACHARYA, IS THE INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
ADEQUACY REGULATION DESIRABLE? 22 (May 3, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=223768 (last visited Feb. 16, 2001 ); BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A New Capital Adequacy Framework 9, 30, available
at http://www.bis.org/pubi/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001); BASEL ACCORD STUDY,
supra note 16, at 20-21, 23.
52. E.g., Basle Brtsh, THE ECONOMIST, May I, 1999, at 69; BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, A New Capital Adequacy Framework 26-28, 30, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001) (loans to banks in OECD
nations are weighted twenty percent, while loans to corporate borrowers are weighted one
hundred percent).
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weighted fifty percent. 5 3 Banks have neatly circumvented this rule by
devising "evergreen" commitments with an initial maturity of less than one
year that the banks roll over on an annual basis. 5 4
4. Divergent Bank Rescue Policies
Finally, opportunities for regulatory arbitrage occur where nations have
identical capital adequacy policies but radically different rescue policies for
failed banks. 5 5 Around the world, the bank rescue policies of different
nations range from strict market discipline (denying recovery to shareholders
of failed banks) to full bailouts for bank shareholders (found in many
emerging economies). Those rescue policies have feedback effects that alter
the future risk propensity of banks. If a country bails out the shareholders of
its banks, the bailout sends signals to shareholders of other banks that they
can increase risk-taking with impunity.5 6 When capital adequacy rules are
uniform from country to country, international banks will have incentives to
charter in countries with lax bank rescue policies, because they will not have
to reserve additional capital to offset the heightened incentives for risk
created by lax bank rescue policies. Moreover, international banks in lax
countries that operate abroad through branches rather than through separately
incorporated subsidiaries have higher incentives to increase their risk-taking
abroad and at home. This is because if the bank becomes insolvent, the
generous rescue policies of the lax country will apply to the entire bank
corporation, including its overseas branches. 57 Thus, as Viral Acharya
recently concluded, 'when the rescue policy of one regime becomes more
forbearing, the change not only destabilizes the banking sector with the lax
53. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A New Capital Adequacy Framework
32, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001). In addition,
commitments of any maturity do not require capital where those commitments can be
unconditionally cancelled at any time. Id.
54. Id.
55. In the United States, for example, almost three quarters of failed banks are resolved
through assisted mergers with other banks (also known as purchase and assumption
agreements), while Finland, Sweden, Norway and Japan rely principally or exclusively on open
bank assistance (government bailouts). ACHARYA, supra note 51, at 23-24.
56. Id. at 24-26.
57. Id. at 32, 36-38.
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regime but through a systemic effect also destabilizes the banking sector of
the stringent regime." 58
In sum, while the Basel Committee has moved rapidly toward
international prudential standards, the inevitable centrifugal forces that are
characteristic of cartels have already reared their head. Cognizant of the
Basel Accord's many flaws, the Basel Committee responded in June 1999 by
issuing a consultative paper seeking comment on amendments to the Basel
Accord. In response to comments, the Committee revised the proposal and
issued a massive second consultative paper on January 16, 200 1, a complex
proposal that together with its supporting documents exceeded 500 pages.59
The draft revisions attempt to discourage regulatory arbitrage in loan
decisions by proposing two alternative ways in which banks may satisfy their
minimum capital requirements as to credit risk. Far from papering over the
cracks, however, the Committee's proposal exposed a deep rift in the
economic philosophies of the G-10 members.
The Committee's first proposed alternative is called the "standardised
approach" and consists of a variation on the four traditional risk-weight
buckets. Under the standardised approach, the Basel Committee would
expand the number of buckets to six or more. More importantly, the
Committee would refine the risk-weight bucket system by tying risk weights
to external credit ratings by agencies such as Standard & Poor's instead of to
asset type, for loans to commercial banks and corporate borrowers (as well
as for securitizations). Risk weights for loans to sovereigns would be tied to
published credit scores of export credit agencies. 60
The purpose of this new approach is to enlist market discipline by
assigning risk weights according to a borrower's actual credit risk as
58. Id. at 38.
59. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A New Capital Adequacy Framework,
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001); BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, The New Basel Capital Accord, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited April 22, 2001); BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, Overview of The New Basel Capital Accord 13, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ.bcbsca.htm (last visited April 22, 2001).
60. The New Basel Capital Accord, supra note 59, at 7, 9-10; A New Capital Adequacy
Framework, supra note 59, at 5,13,26-27. In a related vein, the Basel Committee proposed
increasing the risk weights of assets and commitments that have proven over time to pose
higher risk. Certain higher risk assets would be weighted 150 percent or more. The New Basel
Capital Accord, supra note 59, at II. Similarly, short-term off-balance-sheet commitments
would be weighted twenty percent to stem the use of evergreen commitments. Id. at 12.
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determined by the market, thereby reducing opportunities for arbitrage. 6 1
Under the new system, for example, the risk weight assigned to a corporate
loan could vary from twenty percent to over one hundred percent, depending
on the borrower's external credit rating.62 Similarly, capital charges for asset
securitizations would be based on external credit ratings for the underlying
issue of securities. 63
Under the Committee's second alternative, called the "internal ratings
based" or "IRB" approach, sophisticated international banks would be
permitted to calculate their capital according to their own internal
assessments of credit risk instead of the standard risk-weight buckets. As
proposed, the IRB approach would have two tracks: the foundation approach
and the advanced approach. Under the foundation approach, strong banks
that met certain prerequisites could use their own estimates of probabilities
of default for individual borrowers. Regulators would then estimate the likely
losses upon default, exposure at default and effective maturities to come up
with risk weights. Under the advanced approach, banks meeting the strictest
safety and soundness standards would be allowed to use their own estimates
of loss upon default, exposure at default and effective maturities (in addition
to probabilities of default), instead of those furnished by regulators.
The Committee gave three purposes for the IRB approach. First, the
Committee sought to capitalize on the fact that banks are usually better
informed about their borrowers than credit rating agencies or regulators
(because, among other things, banks can monitor borrowers' financial
61. As one commentator has noted, however, if the Committee does not expand the
number of rating buckets beyond six, serious arbitrage incentives will remain. See JOAO A.C.
SANTOS, BANK CAPITAL REGULATION IN CONTEMPORARY BANKING THEORY: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 19 (Bank for International Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 90, Sept. 2000),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work.htm (last visited April 21, 2001).
62. The New Basel Capital Accord, supra note 59, at 10; A New Capital Adequacy
Framework, supra note 59, at 30-32.
63. The New Basel Capital Accord, supra note 59, at 89; A New Capital Adequacy
Framework, supra note 59, at 36-37. U.S. regulators have proposed a similar approach. Risk-
Based Capital Standards; Recourse and Direct Credit Substitutes, 65 Fed. Reg. 12320 (Mar.
8, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567). In addition, U.S. regulators
have proposed superimposing a dollar-for-dollar capital charge for all retained recourse
interests. See supra note 46; Capital; Leverage and Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital
Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance; Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations of
Other Transfers of FinancialAssets, 65 Fed. Reg. 57993, 57997-98 (Sept. 27, 2000). It is
not yet clear how the two approaches would be harmonized. Id. at 57998-99.
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movements through their checking accounts). In addition, the proposal seeks
to harness the natural incentives of most large banks to avoid undue losses.
Finally, the Committee was responding to criticisms, particularly by banks,
about the drawbacks of the "one size fits all" approach that was implicit in the
original 1988 Basel Accord. 64
Despite the surface appeal of both proposals, they have been embroiled
in controversy from the outset. In response to the proposed revisions, the
same cartel forces surfaced that undermined the original 1988 accord. The
fault lines, moreover, fall along the traditional divide between market systems
and block-holding systems. As this history suggests, the problems of
enforcement that are inherent in any cartel may be even more intractable in
the case of the Basel Accord because the disagreements reflect incompatible
differences in economic structures and norms.
The first example involves the proposal to link risk-weight categories to
external credit ratings. External credit rating agencies are primarily an
incident of the U.S. market system and specifically of capital markets, which
require transparency and disclosure in order to work. In the rest of the world,
which is mostly characterized by block-holding systems, external credit rating
services are scant or simply not in place.65 Rating services have not taken
root in block-holding systems because capital markets in those countries are
weak (reducing the need for external ratings) and the control stakes by banks
that are typical of those systems have traditionally been the substitute for the
data that credit agencies provide. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the three
64. A New Capital Adequacy Framework, supra note 59, at 5-6, 13-14, 37-41. For a
description of the committee's two approaches see The New Basel Capital Accord, supra note
59, at 32-86.
65. See RANGE OF PRACTICE IN BANKS' INTERNAL RATINGS SYSTEMS 22 (Basel Comm. on
Banking Supervision, discussion paper, Jan. 2000), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm; Basle Brush, supra note 52, at 69; BNA BANKING DAILY,
June 9, 1999; Rafael D. Frankel, Singapore Official Announces Guidelines to Coincide With
BaselAccord, BNA BANKING REP., Apr. 2, 2001, at 595. Britain's market system falls in the
middle, having more corporate ratings than Germany but fewer than the United States. See
Basle Brush, supra note 52, at 69.
Even in market systems such as the United States, external credit rating systems are not a
panacea because corporate borrowers are not always externally rated. (As this suggests, to
some extent credit rating agencies and banks serve different segments of borrowers). See
BNA BANKING DAILY, June 9, 1999; A New Capital Adequacy Framework, supra note 59, at
27. For a survey of credit rating systems generally, see CREDIT RATINGS AND COMPLEMENTARY
SOURCES OF CREDIT QUALITY INFORMATION (Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Working
Paper No. 3, Aug. 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm.
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main credit rating systems that the Basel Committee looks to as models are
Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investor Service, Fitch IBCA and Duff &
Phelps, all of which are based in the United States.66
The effect of using external credit rating systems, as conceived by the
Basel Committee, moreover, would often be to favor rated borrowers over
unrated borrowers. Thus, corporate borrowers with ratings of "the very
highest quality" would receive favorable risk weights of twenty or fifty
percent, 67 while most other corporate loans (including unrated loans) would
continue to receive the one hundred percent weight that is customary under
the current system. 68 Since external credit ratings are most prevalent in the
United States, U.S. banks would thus be positioned to obtain preferential
capital treatment over their overseas competitors.
Under the circumstances, the backlash that ensued 69 was understandable.
On the surface, the external credit rating proposal was viewed in Western
Europe and elsewhere as an attempt by U.S. regulators and banks to use their
unique informational advantages to win lower capital ratios for the United
States. Furthermore, those advantages are not necessarily transitory. To the
contrary, those advantages are likely to persist so long as capital markets for
corporate debt offerings remain weaker in block-holding countries than in the
United States and Britain. Alternatively, block-holding countries could
subvert the system, either by encouraging the formation of new competitors
66. See A New Capital Adequacy Framework, supra note 59, at 27 n. 16, 35 table 2; The
New Basel Capital Accord, supra note 59, at 7 n.7; CREDIT RATINGS AND COMPLEMENTARY
SOURCES OF CREDIT QUALITY INFORMATION 2 & n. 1, 9 (Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
Working Paper No. 3, Aug. 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm; Bank Rules
in Disarray, supra note 21, at 75. See also http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/aboutus/
index.htm; http://www.modys.com (with links to "About Moody's" and "Moody's History");
http://www.dcrco.com (with links to "About DCR, A Corporate Profile" and "Fitch IBCA/DCR
Merger Information"); New interests, new conflicts, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001.
67. A New Basel CapitalAccord, supra note 59, at 10.
68. Id. This is not to say that rated borrowers would invariably receive preferential
treatment. At a minimum, borrowers with lower ratings would continue to receive risk weights
of 100 percent. Indeed, under the Basel Committee's proposed scenario, it is possible that a
rated borrower with a poor rating would be weighted 150 percent and thus be treated more
harshly than unrated borrowers, who would be weighted 100 percent. See id.; Growing Basle,
supra note 44, at 69-70; Bank Rules in Disarray, supra note 2 1, at 75. To that extent, banks
that lend to unrated borrowers would have the same opportunity as previously to exploit the
risk-weight buckets to their advantage.
69. See. e.g., Bank Rules in Disarra,. supra note 21, at 75; Basle Brush, supra note 52,
at 69.
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to Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch IBCA, with the attendant danger of
grade inflation, or by permitting weaker banks to switch to the IRB system.70
Either way, the overriding goals of capital adequacy-i.e., competitive parity
and safeguards against systemic risk -- would be disserved.
Market and block-holding systems also split over the Committee's
alternative proposal to permit sophisticated banks to use their own internal
credit risk assessments in lieu of external ratings. Once again, the United
States and specifically American banks were the major proponents of the IRB
approach. Major banks in block-holding systems (most visibly Germany) had
barely any experience with internal credit rating systems.71 Until the Basel
Accord revisions were proposed, those banks did not need to resort to well-
developed internal systems, because they used their equity stakes in corporate
borrowers to monitor credit risks. Once again, as with the case of external
credit ratings, the IRB standard largely favors U.S. banks, to the detriment of
their overseas competitors. 72
70. See. e.g., Sweeter Basle, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2001. The Basel Committee would
require all external credit rating agencies (known as "external credit assessment institutions")
to be recognized by national supervisory authorities under criteria formulated by the Basel
Committee. See A New Basel Capital Accord, supra note 59, at 12-13. Banking supervisors
in many countries would face political pressure to grant recognition to lax credit rating
agencies, particularly from domestic concerns.
7 1. Bank Rules in Disarray, supra note 2 1, at 75.
72. Basle Brush, supra note 52, at 69 ("Regulators in continental Europe have been far
cooler [to the internal credit ratings proposal]. Edgar Meister, the Bundesbank's representative
on the committee, has been consistently skeptical.").
There are other serious problems with relying on internal ratings systems for capital
adequacy. For one thing, it is questionable how well those systems measure risk. See RANGE
OF PRACTICE IN BANKS' INTERNAL RATINGS SYSTEMS 5 (Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
discussion paper, Jan. 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm ("it is less clear
in some cases whether the information emerging from these measurement systems is genuinely
integral to the risk management of the bank at this time"); Statement of the Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee on The Basel Committee's Revised Capital Accord Proposal I
(Statement No. 169, Feb. 26, 2001), available at http://www.aei.org/shdw/shdwI69.htm
(hereinafter "Statement of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee"). Furthermore, there
are immense conflicts of interest inherent in using internal rating systems, a problem that the
Basel Committee has barely mentioned. Banks would have powerful incentives to rig their
internal rating systems in order to downplay the amount of capital they would have to reserve.
Banks that engaged in such deception would be aided, moreover, by the proliferation of
individual internal rating systems, each with its own standards and idiosyncrasies, hampering
oversight and making comparison virtually impossible across banks and nations. See RANGE
OF PRACTICE IN BANKS' INTERNAL RATINGS SYSTEMS, supra, at 39; Statement of the Shadow
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B. DIVERGENT EFFICIENCY NORMS IN MARKET AND BLOCK-
HOLDING SYSTEMS
As the problems enforcing the Basel Accord indicate, there is an even
more fundamental source of instability in the Basel Committee's edicts,
arising from the inherent problems in forcing a single, culturally dependent
template of efficiency over banking systems at different stages of
development and with fundamentally different needs and norms. 7 3 The sit-
ins and the riots at the 1999 negotiations of the World Trade Organization in
Seattle 7 4 were testament to the growing backlash against the muscle of
Western multinational corporations, Western governments and international
financial institutions. Increasingly, the Basel Committee's initiatives may be
vulnerable to similar opposition.
In the final portion of this article, I would like to explore this problem as
it applies to varying efficiency norms in patterns of bank lending. Previously
I spoke about the information asymmetry between depositors and banks.
Banks suffer from information asymmetries of their own with respect to
borrowers. When banks extend credit, they do not know with perfect
assurance that the loan will be repaid in a timely manner and in full. Every
economy has methods for attempting to redress that asymmetry. Those
methods, however, can vary depending on a variety of factors, including the
economy's stage of development and business norms. Mature capitalist
economies have the greatest latitude in that regard, because of the richness
and stability of their monitoring mechanisms. Thus, banks in mature
economies can depend on courts to enforce collateral and notes, may have
access to credit rating services, can analyze the borrower's likelihood of
repayment through desktop underwriting models that have been actuarially
Financial Regulatory Committee, supra, at 1, 4; BNA BANKING DAILY, June 9, 1999; SANTOS,
supra note 6 1, at 19 n.46. Today, major banks use a variety of internal rating systems, ranging
from those "focussed on the judgement of expert personnel" to "those based solely on statistical
models." RANGE OF PRACTICE IN BANKS' INTERNAL RATINGS SYSTEMS, supra, at 4, 17. A Basel
Committee report recently found potentially significant inconsistencies in the data sources
reviewed by banks, the definitions and tools used to measure that data, and the conclusions as
to risk that were drawn. See id. at 4, 10, 14, 16, 42.
73. See, e.g., Financial Standards- hidian Understanding, FINANCIAL TIMES INFORMATION,
March 22, 2001. Professor Douglas M. Branson has recently discussed this problem as it
pertains to global convergence in corporate governance. See BRANSON, supra note 1.
74. Sam H. Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National Guard Is Called Out to Quell
Trade-Talk Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A-1, cols. 3-6.
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tested and can monitor the borrower's financial status through computerized
loan reports.
In block-holding systems such as Germany's, banks also monitor
borrowers through equity stakes and direct representation on the borrower's
board (something that is banned in the United States).75 This form of
lending, which I will call "connected lending," is one of the hallmarks that
distinguishes block-holding systems from their market system counterparts.
In block-holding systems, connected lending of one form or another is
considered integral to both banking and corporate governance and, as such,
is legally sanctioned. Conversely, in market systems such as the United
States, connected lending is heavily regulated and strongly discouraged. 76
Instead, in the United States, arms' length terms are an overriding norm in
lending. 77 Connected lending is frowned upon, in part because of concerns
that cozy relationships might impair underwriting judgments and also because
financing might dry up for new entrepreneurial ventures. In contrast, the
German system views preferential treatment of connected borrowers as
beneficial on balance, because of the informational advantages of ongoing
membership on the borrower's board, the bank's pivotal role in monitoring
corporate governance and the long-term horizon of investment. Weak
protections for minority shareholders in block-holding systems such as
Germany's, moreover, mean that if the interest rate or the prospects for return
are suboptimal, banks may seek to augment low returns through other means,
such as interested transactions, insider trading or higher interest charges over
the long term.78
These differences become even starker in emerging economies. Unlike
their wealthier neighbors, many emerging economies have little choice except
to embrace connected lending to a greater or lesser degree. In those nations,
little of the infrastructure is in place that would allow banks to bridge the
natural information gaps with unfamiliar loan applicants. In economies
where the rule of law is weak and force is the rule, where credit reporting
systems have not taken root, where social trust is frayed and inflation is
75. See, e.g., David Chamy, Special Symposium Issue: The German Corporate
Governance System, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 145, 151-158 (1998); Roe, supra note 1, at
I.
76. See McCoy, supra note 3, § 6.04[2].
77. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-I.
78. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note I, at 267-68; Rajan & Zingales, supra note
4, at 40, 42-43.
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rampant, banks will generally restrict their lending to individuals and
businesses whom they know and trust.79
In the abstract, connected lending of this sort may not be optimally
efficient. Price signals are weaker in block-holding systems than in systems
favoring arms' length lending.80 In addition, connected lending often diverts
capital from more efficient uses and is conducive to kickbacks at its worst.
Obviously, the grosser forms of connected lending are signs of underlying
pathology. Examples include extensions of credit where repayment is known
to be unlikely or where the borrower's management in effect controls the
lending decisions of the bank. But where blatant misconduct such as looting
of the bank is not involved and the bank is acting in good faith, connected
lending may be the best that banks can do in a bad situation, until some later
date when the legal and information infrastructures are in place. In more
mature economies such as Germany or Japan, where connected lending is not
strictly a function of an economy's stage of development, it nevertheless may
be integral due to other tradeoffs, such as the importance of banks as
corporate monitors.
Nevertheless, when we examine Principle 10 of the Basel Committee's
Core Principles, we see the admonition, characteristic of market systems, that
"[c]onnected lending ... can lead to preferential treatment in lending and thus
greater risk of loan losses."81 Trying to force block-holding systems to
abandon connected lending altogether and apply an arms' length model
patterned after loans to strangers may ultimately cause more harm than good.
Banks may simply steer clear of the well and withhold private extensions of
credit altogether, instead shifting their investments to government securities.
In transition economies, if banks do lend to strangers, they well might lose
their shirt, increasing the risks of bank runs and losses to small depositors.
That, in turn, can retard the growth of domestic banks by leading to
domination by foreign banks.82 Finally, in countries such as Germany where
banks are important monitors of corporations, proscriptions against connected
lending to related borrowers could have serious adverse consequences for
imbedded norms of corporate governance.
79. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1, at 227 nn.41-42; Rajan & Zingales,
supra note 4, at 4 1.
80. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 4, at 43-44.
81. Core Principles, supra note 19, at 20.
82. See, e.g., Terrill, supra note 38, at 280.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Basel Committee needs to tread cautiously if these
deep-seated sources of incompatibility are not to undermine consensus. At
a minimum, the juggernaut toward global harmonization in banking could
well engender experiences such as Russia's, where the Basel Committee's
standards have been honored in the breach as often as not. At the worst, its
pronouncements could lead to calls to storm the barricades, similar to what
occurred in Seattle, and most recently in Genoa, if the Commitlee's lack of
political accountability and legitimacy came to a head. If the Basel
Committee continues to ignore these concerns, it will do so at its peril.

